The Sociology of Party Decline

Democrats are having trouble with working-class voters because many of them don't come from these communities or occupational backgrounds.

There are three primary ways people study the American electorate. The first, and most well-known, is demographic analysis. We do a ton of that here at TLP. Arising mainly out of survey research, which provides comparative data trends going back many decades, demographic analysis examines voter behavior based on who people are—their gender, their race, their ethnicity, their age, their household income, their religion, their education level, etc. Demographic analysis tells us things like college-educated voters and women are increasingly voting Democratic while non-college voters and men are moving Republican.

The second approach is attitudinal analysis. This also emerges primarily from survey research but typically includes examination of views on a range of matters beyond politics. Attitudinal research looks at Americans based on their characteristics and what they believe—their views on the economy, the government, cultural and moral values, and a host of individual issues from immigration and crime to social programs and government spending to national security and foreign affairs. Related to this line of inquiry is psychographic analysis which looks at how lifestyle and shopping choices, interests, hobbies, media consumption, and personality traits might shape how people vote or behave in politics. This attitudinal work tells us things like those who were strongly concerned about the cost of living, illegal immigration, and crime in 2024 voted heavily for Trump while those mainly concerned about democracy, abortion, and climate change voted for Harris. It also serves as the basis for numerous political stereotypes that crop up every election cycle (often annoyingly) such as "Subaru-driving liberals" and “truck-driving conservatives”; “Whole Foods” and “Cracker Barrel” counties; or “Fox News” and “MSNBC” voters.

The third main approach to studying politics is geographic analysis. This usually involves examinations of voting patterns and trends based on where people live—their region, their state, their city or town, their Census tract, their specific neighborhood. This type of work produces common political concepts such as “blue states” and “red states,” “purple” suburbs and exurban areas, and “place-based” patterns in voting and politics based on the relative wealth, inequality, natural resources, and economic growth potential in different areas. Geographic analysis provides us with familiar patterns such as the partisan divide between urban and rural voters or emerging trends such as Republican strength in the Sun Belt states and Democratic strength on the coasts. It also yields insights into notable new trends such as Trump making inroads in some big cities and traditionally “blue” geographic areas and Democratic-leaning states losing electoral power due to population loss to Republican-leaning states.

A fourth, and unfortunately more overlooked, approach to politics is occupational analysis. This research examines political patterns based on what people do for a living—the types of jobs people have, what fields they work in, their specific positions within industries, blue collar/white collar distinctions, and manual labor versus knowledge economy work. Occupational status is a demographic trait but it’s distinct and cross-cutting in many ways in that people of different individual characteristics such as race and gender can work in the same jobs or fields. Similarly, work often overlaps with other demographic and geographic categories—think of some jobs being traditionally gender-based (such as teaching and child care for women or law enforcement and construction for men) or geographically concentrated (such as the oil and gas industry in Texas and Wyoming or the technology sector in California and Massachusetts).

Occupational analysis is interesting mainly because it provides unique information about the political socialization and identity formation of voters based on how their employment structures their worldview and positions. What we do, how we work, who we work with, and how our work relates to other jobs in different fields all shape individual perspectives about issues including the national economy; wages, salaries, and benefits; private and public sector power; government investments; social programs; labor unions; regulation; trade; budget deficits; roads and public transportation; and business development. Work life, as much as other family and personal backgrounds, also shapes people’s views through social and professional networks that inculcate particular norms, interests, and values that often line up with partisan politics.

Occupational analysis is highly relevant to Democrats trying to understand their current electoral predicament—specifically, why the traditional working-class party of FDR continues to hemorrhage these voters all across the country.

A few years back, Verdant Labs produced a fascinating graphic depiction of the intersection of occupation and political affiliation (as measured by donations to the two political parties using F.E.C. data). Some heavily Republican industries and fields include fossil fuels (89 percent R), farming and forestry (72 percent R), insurance (66 percent R), and the military (60 percent R). Some heavily Democratic ones include the legal profession (73 percent D), foodservice (70 percent D), medical services (61 percent D), and IT (74 percent D). Notably, some sectors such as transportation show different partisan splits depending on what a person’s position is within that field. For example, truck and delivery drivers trend heavily Republican while locomotive engineers and taxi drivers are more Democratic. Some of this may be related to the different types of people who inhabit these jobs (non-college and non-urban men in the former compared to those with higher education or immigrant backgrounds in the latter), but the nature of the work and who they work with also might explain some of the job-based political differences.

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What does this analysis tell us? If you think about sociological base of the Democratic Party today—the combination of demographic, geographic, and occupational backgrounds of the institutional leaders, donors, base voters, and activists that make up the party—it’s stocked mainly with college-educated people from big cities and coastal states who work in non-profit organizations, universities, knowledge economy jobs, the media and entertainment, public sector unions, some parts of big tech, and in traditional professions such as the law.

The Republican Party is mostly a mirror image of Democrats (at least its voting base if not its staffers, funders and activists)—much more working-class demographically, geographically, and occupationally.

The two party’s sociological differences match up pretty well with voting patterns. For example, 2024 analysis from the Economic Innovation Group/Echelon Insights shows Harris voters in the workforce were more female, college-educated, urban, and white collar while Trump voters were more male, non-college educated, small town/rural, and blue collar in background.

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You can see the problem for Democrats. Their party clearly is not run mainly by or for people without four-year degrees, who live outside major urban centers, and who are employed in more traditional working-class jobs, the military, or small business professions. Since working-class voters (defined as non-college) still comprise the bulk of the U.S. electorate—58 percent of 2024 voters were non-college educated compared to 42 percent with a four-year degree or higher—and even greater numbers in critical swing states and Senate races, Democrats will be at a perpetual disadvantage in future national elections if they do not drastically alter the sociological base of the party.

Compounding their difficulties, the party’s sociological structure determines many of the attitudinal and issue concerns that occupy the minds of Democratic elected officials, their staff members, and their campaigns. Increasingly, these preoccupations include many progressive cultural values and out-of-the mainstream views about race, gender, immigration, crime, climate change, and government spending that are anathema to working-class voters, as documented extensively in TLP over the years.

Sociological differences in party composition also explain why many of Trump’s actions targeting government workers, high-profile legal firms, and universities have so far not produced a huge outcry from working-class voters—they don’t inhabit or come from these work environments. Party composition differences also explain strong working-class support for Trump’s deportation policies and his stance on transgender issues coupled with rising skepticism about his economic stewardship and worries about things like tariffs. These mixed opinions reflect the cultural foundations and occupational standing of many working-class Republican and independent voters.

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If Democrats want to reach more working-class voters in upcoming elections they need to be clear-eyed about the sociological challenge facing the party. Democrats can’t fix a working-class problem by employing more college-educated lawyers and knowledge-class professionals to do “worker-focused” message testing and media outreach. Same with “populist” bashing of corporations and the rich carried out mainly by disgruntled liberal arts grads and urban socialists. It’s transparently inauthentic and won’t work.

If Democrats really want to reach more working-class voters they first need to be present where these voters live, and then recruit more candidates and leaders from these communities and work backgrounds. It’s that simple.

Of course, one can be a college-educated candidate for office and still be working-class in terms of their family history, occupational background, or military service and in their approach to the issues that matter most to these voters.

Successful Democrats like Marie Gluesenkamp Perez, Jared Golden, and Ruben Gallego who won in highly competitive environments understand the sociological needs facing the party. As Gallego described after his recent Senate win:

“People got to know who I was and what my values were, and so that they got to know me as Ruben the Marine veteran, Ruben the dad, Ruben the working-class kid who has lived the American dream and wants you to live the American dream,” Gallego told The Associated Press. “And I think when things started going bad we were able to resist the tide because people knew me and they had a perspective of me, they knew I was fighting for them.”

Democrats should listen to Gallego and others like him in the party and bring in many, many more candidates, staffers, and activists who come from and understand the lives, inner desires, and economic needs of America’s diverse working-class communities. Party rebuilding requires a strong working-class foundation to help shape policy development, issue concerns, media efforts, and campaign styles to better appeal to most American voters.