The Importance of Nautical NATO

F-35B jets line the deck of HMS Queen Elizabeth, as the Royal Navy aircraft carrier leaves Portsmouth Harbour. (Photo: Andrew Matthews/Getty Images)

Earlier this month, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrated 75 years undergirding collective security in Europe.

When most people think about NATO, past and present, it’s usually ground forces that come to mind. Think of American tanks guarding the Fulda Gap from the Red Army—and now the Suwalki Gap from Vladimir Putin’s Russia—as the alliance’s frontline troops. And with Ukrainians now in their third year of bravely fighting off Putin’s army, Westerners tend to hear about the land-based weapons NATO members have armed Ukraine with, like HIMARS and Javelins.

People often forget NATO has also always played a vital role at sea.

For example, throughout the Cold War, the United States Navy’s Sixth Fleet had a constant presence in the Mediterranean, protecting against a potential Soviet attack on allies like Greece, Italy, and Turkey. One of the Navy’s most important missions in those years was watching for Soviet submarines, particularly those armed with nuclear missiles, sailing through the GIUK—the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. (The 1990 movie The Hunt for Red October gives an impression of what a naval standoff that far north might have looked like, with or without a nearly silent propulsion system on any of the vessels involved.)

The fall of the Soviet Union did not mean the end of Russian naval threats to transatlantic security.

The 2000 Summer-X exercise (during which the submarine Kursk sank) involved more than 30 Russian vessels, and showed the world that Moscow could still bring firepower to sea. The early 21^st century has seen an escalation of Russian naval activity, from the Baltic Sea to the Indian Ocean. In 2016, then-Vice Admiral James Foggo III, commander of the Sixth Fleet, and analyst Alarik Fritz, warned that NATO was already engaged in a “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic,” thanks to Russia modernizing its submarine force and constructing bases in the Arctic.

It is vital, therefore, that America’s commitment to NATO continues to have a strong maritime component. If Putin remains stymied in Ukraine, he will look for Western weaknesses elsewhere, including at sea. America and its allies need to make sure their navies are ready.

The U.S. provides large amounts of maritime equipment and weaponry to its fellow NATO members. Britain and Norway patrol the Arctic and the North Sea for Russian ships using the P-8A maritime surveillance plane. The Polish and Turkish fleets include Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates. Greek special forces use the Mark V Special Operations Craft. The Norwegian Coast Guard is buying the MH-60R Seahawk helicopter. Canada’s next class of frigate will carry Tomahawk missiles (TLAMs), a weapon that is already a mainstay of Britain’s Royal Navy.

Arming allies with American-manufactured equipment means they can bear some of the burden of transatlantic security. However, it also means that when problems strike the U.S. Navy, allies are affected, too.

For example, earlier this year the Navy announced that the debut of the Constellation class frigate—planned as a more reliable successor to the problem-plagued Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)—would be delayed from 2026 to 2029. Greece has also expressed interest in buying ships of this class, and thus the Hellenic Navy may suffer if delays turn out to last even longer than three years.

The alliance conducts many exercises to stay in shape should it come to blows with Russia. Exercises including Trident Juncture, Cold Response, Sea Breeze, and BALTOPS all keep NATO’s navies ready for battle, and improve their skill at operating together under tough conditions. NATO’s two newest members, Finland and Sweden, co-hosted the latest iteration of Cold Response this year—dubbed Nordic Response—along with charter member Norway.

NATO navies also carry out numerous missions together, whether they are under the NATO umbrella or not.

For example, the alliance carried out anti-piracy patrols in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden from 2009-2016, which dramatically reduced the number of Somali pirate attacks that terrorized international shipping. The world’s attention has returned to those bodies of water in recent months, as the U.S. and Royal Navies have fought back against the Iran-backed Houthis in their attacks on global trade. At its peak, NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, which ended the 42-year dictatorship of Muammar Qaddafi, involved 21 ships in the Mediterranean (as well as an average of 120 air sorties per day). In 2018, American, French, and British ships struck targets in Syria in response to one of dictator Bashar al-Assad’s many uses of chemical weapons against his own people.

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There are several things the U.S. can do to help improve the nautical side of transatlantic security, beyond maintaining and expanding its own Navy. These are not substitutes for America investing in its own ships, shipyards, workers, and other necessities of maritime security, but they are a valuable form of burden sharing. Helping allied navies do more to defend against Russia is good for the U.S., especially when Americans seem unsure of their role in the world.

Build up Black Sea navies. When Russia started its war on Ukraine two years ago, the Montreux Convention suddenly popped up on many radar screens. Ratified in 1936, this treaty gives Turkey the right to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Turkey did just that in response to Putin’s invasion, preventing Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea fleet with ships from outside. This has had a devastating effect, as Ukrainian missiles and drones (naval as well as aerial) have wreaked havoc on Russian ships.

Unfortunately, the Montreux Convention also limits the tonnage of ships from non-Black Sea countries entering the Sea. Such countries are limited to a total of 45,000 tons at any given time, no more than 30,000 of which may belong to a single country (and none of them can include submarines). What is more, warships subject to those limits may not stay in the Black Sea for more than 21 days. That means the United States is tightly limited in the amount of naval reinforcement it can give to NATO members Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.

The U.S. Coast Guard has already given Island-class patrol boats to Georgia (a non-NATO Black Sea country invaded by Russia in 2008), as well as to NATO ally Greece.

It could discuss giving more of them to Bulgaria and Romania. With the USCG transitioning to the newer Sentinel-class cutter, what better use for vessels being retired than service in an allied navy on the front lines of the fight against Putin? And while the LCS has not met its original high expectations, the U.S. is right to explore giving them to allies and partners. Why not those working on the Black Sea?

Base more U.S. ships in Europe. Since 2012, there have been U.S. Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain. They are positioned there to help deter Russian missile attacks against NATO. The Pentagon is so confident in their abilities that it plans to increase the number of destroyers at Rota from four to six.

For the sake of reducing the time it takes to get American ships to NATO’s front line in times of crisis, it is worth looking at other European ports for American vessels. The Navy’s facility in Gaeta, Italy, is a possible location—it already hosts the Sixth Fleet flagship USS Mount Whitney. In 2020, the U.S. homeported the expeditionary mobile base USS Hershel "Woody" Williams in Souda Bay, Greece. It could base other ships there.

A 2017 report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Restoring American Seapower,” even called for stationing American ships in British ports. While this may reduce British initiative in keeping its own defenses in tip-top shape, it should not be completely ruled out.

Expand carrier cooperation. In 2012, America and Britain began an initiative on aircraft carrier cooperation. The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy agreed to pursue, “[E]ffective cooperation on the generation, training, operation, and sustainability of their respective aircraft carrier forces.” This pooled the resources of the two most powerful carrier forces in NATO to make their ships and aircraft more interoperable.

This agreement has borne valuable fruit in the last few years. In 2021, a combined Anglo-American force of F-35 fighters deployed aboard the British carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. Together they took part in missions across the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific, from airstrikes on the remnants of the Islamic State to a Maritime Partnership Exercise alongside American, Australian, and Japanese forces. Last year, a U.S. Mojave drone on HMS Prince of Wales became the first uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) to take off and land on a British carrier.

There is great potential for expanding this carrier cooperation to other NATO members. Four alliance members in the Mediterranean have carriers or carrier-like amphibious assault ships: France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey. A certain amount of cooperation is already taking place among these forces. Italy and the U.K. are among the countries buying the U.S. Marine Corps’ F-35B variant, while the design of Turkey’s new carrier, TCG Anadolu, is based on Spain’s ESPS Juan Carlos I. And while transatlantic cooperation always risks running aground on the shoals of French pride, the French flagship FS Charles de Gaulle carries the American-made E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning plane. This is a strong foundation to build on.

Expanded carrier cooperation could offer multiple benefits to NATO’s carrier club. It could help them learn from each other’s use of UAVs, for example. Turkey is well known for its innovative and devastating drones—both in its own use in Libya and Azerbaijan’s and Ukraine’s use of Turkish-built UAVs—and Anadolu’s air wing includes drones as well as conventional aircraft. In its counterterrorist campaign in Mali, France used American-made MQ-9 Reapers in tandem with its own Mirage 2000 fighters.

Cooperation could also help develop the Lightning Carrier concept. While America’s carrier force consists mainly of large, nuclear-powered supercarriers, tests in 2019 and 2022 showed it was viable to place up to 20 F-35s on an amphibious assault ship, letting a vessel that mainly transports Marines and their equipment serve instead as a small aircraft carrier. NATO allies’ carriers range in length from 757 feet (Juan Carlos I) to 857 feet (Charles de Gaulle), compared to the U.S. Navy's new 844-foot America class amphibious assault ships. They are good platforms for the U.S. to learn from if it seeks to bring the Lightning Carrier idea to its full potential.

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If Congress should neglect to invest in American maritime power, or if America should once again have a president who denies the importance of NATO, and has no problem with Russian aggression, European countries will need greater capability to defend themselves at sea. And building ships for European navies—with or without building them for the U.S. Navy as well—could still allow America’s shipbuilding industry to contribute to American economic growth.

Hopefully this nautical alliance will hold firm, but it is good to be prepared in case it does not.

The maritime side of transatlantic security can never be overlooked. Throughout NATO’s history, the fact that America and Europe have an ocean between them has always posed a risk to allied unity. Distance in geography can lead to distance in goals and purposes if countries neglect the connections between them.

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He writes The Non-Progressive Democrat on Substack. Follow him on Twitter at @MDPurzycki.