The Democrats’ Hispanic Voter Problem Deepens

It really is getting worse.

Democrats are steadily losing ground with Hispanic voters. The seriousness of this problem tends to be underestimated in Democratic circles for several reasons: (1) they don’t realize how big the shift is; (2) they don’t realize how thoroughly it undermines the most influential Democratic theory of the case for building their coalition; and (3) they believe that any Hispanic flirtation with the GOP is merely temporary—they will “come back home” to the Democrats.

On the second point, consider that most Democrats like to believe that, since a relatively conservative white population is in sharp decline while a presumably liberal nonwhite population keeps growing, the course of social and demographic change should deliver an ever-growing Democratic coalition. It is simply a matter of getting this burgeoning nonwhite population to the polls.

But consider further that, as the Census documents, the biggest single driver of the increased nonwhite population is the growth of the Hispanic population. They are by far the largest group within the Census-designated nonwhite population (19 percent vs. 12 percent for blacks). While their representation among voters considerably lags their representation in the overall population, it is fair to say that voting trends among this group will decisively shape voting trends among nonwhites in the future since their share of voters will continue to increase while black voter share is expected to remain roughly constant.

It therefore follows that, if Hispanic voting trends continue to move steadily against the Democrats, the pro-Democratic effect of nonwhite population growth will be blunted, if not cancelled out entirely, and that very influential Democratic theory of the case falls apart. That could—or should—provoke quite a sea change in Democratic thinking.

It’s getting late enough in the current cycle to venture an assessment of whether the rightward drift of Hispanics is continuing. Short answer: it is. Let’s take a look at some of the data.

1. For context, it’s useful to review what happened in the 2020 election. In that election, Hispanics, after four years of Trump, gave him substantially more support than they did in 2016. According to Catalist, in 2020 Latinos had an amazingly large 16-point margin shift toward Trump. Among Latinos, Cubans did have the largest shifts toward Trump (26 points), but those of Mexican origin also had a 12-point shift and even Puerto Ricans moved toward Trump by 18 points.

2. Latino shifts toward Trump were widely dispersed geographically. Hispanic shifts toward Trump were not confined to Florida (28 points) and Texas (18 points) but also included states like Wisconsin (20 points), Nevada (18 points), Pennsylvania (12 points), Arizona (10 points), and Georgia (8 points).

3. These shifts were also heavily concentrated among working-class (noncollege) Hispanics, which is the overwhelming majority of Hispanic voters. Catalist data indicate that the decline in the Democratic margin among working-class Hispanics was 19 points between 2016 and 2020, compared to 9 points among college Hispanics.

4. A strong working-class Hispanic shift is consistent with detailed precinct-level analysis of the 2020 vote in Hispanic (and Asian) neighborhoods released by The New York Times in December of 2020. And a just-released analysis of precinct voting in Philadelphia by The Philadelphia Inquirer shows a stunning 75 percent net increase in the vote for Trump in working-class Hispanic precincts between 2016 and 2020.

5. The latest data indicate that the Democratic margin among Hispanics is continuing to fall this cycle. Cook Political Report maintains a database of crosstabs from high quality surveys and finds the average margin for Harris among Hispanics to be around 12 points. That’s an 11-point drop from Biden’s 23-point margin among Hispanics in 2020 (which in turn was a 16-point drop from Clinton’s advantage in 2016).

6. Similarly, Adam Carlson at the Split Ticket site maintains a “2024 General Election Crosstab Aggregator.” His most recent average for Hispanics finds a 14-point margin for Harris among these voters, making for a slightly lower drop of 9 points relative to 2020.

7. The super-high quality New York Times/Siena poll (A+ in Nate Silver’s pollster ratings) polled twice in September and found Harris leading by an average of 13 points among Hispanics across the two polls, implying a 10-point drop in Democratic support relative to 2020. All pretty consistent.

8. A very recent bipartisan national poll of Latinos, conducted for NBC News/Telemundo, finds Harris ahead of Trump by 14 points. In their comparison to merged NBC data from previous cycles, this represents a drop of 22 points in Hispanic margin compared to 2020 (though if compared to the Catalist post-election data cited above the implied drop is less).

9. There are some very interesting internals from this poll that are worth mentioning. Among men, Trump and Harris are exactly even at 47 percent support for each candidate while Harris leads among women by 20 points.

10. Among Hispanics under 35, Harris only leads Trump by 10 points, a 34-point drop from their 2020 merged data.

11. Among Latino men under 50, Trump actually leads Harris by 9 points. Trump also leads by 13 points among all working-class Latino men.

12. Interestingly, while Trump is preferred over Harris among all Hispanic voters on dealing with inflation and the cost of living and the economy generally, his biggest lead over Harris (13 points) is actually on “securing the border and controlling immigration”(!)

13. Finally, the NBC News writeup notes:

In this poll, 54 percent of Latino voters prefer a Democratic-controlled Congress, versus 42 percent who want Republicans in charge.

That 12-point lead represents a steady decline from September 2012 (when the Democrats’ advantage was 45 points), September 2016 (when it was 34 points), October 2020 (26 points) and September 2022 before that midterm election (21 points).

The times they are a-changin’! While we are still far away from Democrats losing majority support among Hispanics, the signs of a continuing rightward shift among these voters are unmistakable. Combined with general deterioration among working-class voters of all races, it appears Democrats, win or lose in this election, are in urgent need of a new theory of the case for growing their coalition. Without it, any majorities they attain will be tenuous, undercutting their ability to govern effectively. And, no doubt, leaving the American people increasingly frustrated.