Recovering the Ancient Wisdom of the Obama Era

Don’t be afraid to piss off the left!

There’s been a lot of good news lately for the Harris campaign. Every national polling average has her ahead of Trump with margins ranging from 1 point in the New York Times average to 3.1 points in Nate Silver’s average (average lead = 2.1 points).

Silver’s state-level polling averages, which are relatively aggressive in incorporating new information, have Harris enjoying big improvements relative to Biden every swing state and now has her ahead in all these states except for Georgia and North Carolina. Moreover, his forecasting model makes her the favorite in Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin and tips her as a 57 percent overall favorite to take the Electoral College.

That’s the good news. The bad news is that Harris is still running significantly behind where Biden and Hillary Clinton were at this point in the 2020 and 2016 cycles. Using the RCP averages (538 does not provide 2016 averages but their 2020 average closely tracked the 2020 RCP averages), at this point Biden was ahead of Trump by 7.7 points and Clinton was ahead by 6.8 points. That compares to the current RCP average of 1.1 points.

Moreover, looking at the “Rustbelt three”—Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—which loom so large in this election, here are the RCP averages for this point in the cycle for 2024 Harris-Trump, 2020 Biden-Trump, and 2016 Clinton-Trump in that order and for each state:

Michigan: +2.4/+6.7/+6.8

Pennsylvania: -.2/+6.4/+9.2

Wisconsin: +1.2/+6.5/+9.4

Given that Clinton lost all three of these states in 2016 and Biden carried them by an average of only 1.6 points in 2020, this pattern does not inspire confidence. In general, and particularly with these data in mind, the race is still way too close for comfort.

Of course, just because the polls tended to underestimate Trump support in 2020 and 2016 both nationally and in key states doesn’t mean they are today. But that remains a possibility. As Sean Trende notes:

[T]here is a sound social science concept of which we should be aware. In fact, it is particularly dangerous right now. It is known as partisan non-response bias. The idea is this: When events favor one political side or the other, partisans become more (or less) likely to take a poll. 

The intuition is this: After Biden’s disastrous June debate, Democrats really didn’t want to talk about the election. Republicans on the other hand, wanted to talk about nothing else. It was probably the best time to be a Republican in a presidential election since, well, Mitt Romney beat Barack Obama in the first presidential debate. Some of Trump’s poll lead in July probably was due to a newfound Republican eagerness to respond to polls.

At the same time, Democrats are overwhelmingly engaged right now. They have reason to believe they just avoided a near-death scenario and potential wipeout. They have a new presidential nominee, about whom they are overwhelmingly excited, and they like the vice presidential selection. They would love nothing more than to talk to you, or a pollster, about the 2024 election.

Unfortunately, there is no way to know for sure whether this is happening or not. But it could be in which the case the race, already close, may be closer than it looks. If you’re the Harris campaign you want to keep this in mind and take appropriate evasive action. “Kamalamania” may be more fragile than it appears.

A relevant cautionary tale is provided by an earlier example of a politician suddenly ascending to be their party’s standard-bearer and rocketing into the lead. This is the example of “Jacindamania” where Jacinda Ardern in New Zealand in 2017 replaced Labour leader Andrew Little who appeared to be headed to a landslide defeat (sound familiar?). Her candidacy caught fire and very soon her party was in the lead. But the conservative party, the National Party, counter-attacked, aiming withering fire at Ardern’s considerable vulnerabilities. By the time the election arrived the National Party actually out-polled Labour and Ardern by 7 points. (She was still able to form a government, but only by forming a coalition with New Zealand’s right-populist and green parties.)

This suggests a missing part of the current Trump campaign that is no doubt helping Harris—disciplined, withering fire directed at Harris’s vulnerabilities, of which there are many, has been lacking. Trump, by general consensus, has done a poor job on this politics 101 part of his campaign, indulging his proclivities for dwelling on various pet beefs, rather than concentrating attacks where they would most hurt his opponent (see this brutally effective ad from the McCormick Senate campaign in Pennsylvania for how this could be done). If he continues on the former course, the Harris campaign may continue to dominate; if he and his campaign take the latter path, Kamalamania may go the way of Jacindamania.

The question for the Harris campaign therefore should be how to armor themselves against such a turn in the campaign. This is where recovering the ancient wisdom of the Obama era could come in handy. Harris is perfectly willing to disavow previous unpopular positions on controversial issues and allude in very general terms to a current position that is closer to the center of public opinion. But what’s she’s not willing to do is piss off the left. And unless you’re willing to piss off the left, you can’t convincingly and durably occupy the center of American politics. That’s the real insurance against a counterattack by the GOP.

Obama understood this. He was willing to piss of the left in pursuit of a broader coalition. Here are a couple of examples but there are many more.

On immigration:

“We simply cannot allow people to pour into the United States undetected, undocumented, unchecked, and circumventing the line of people who are waiting patiently, diligently, and lawfully to become immigrants to this country.”

He added that those who employ people living in this country illegally “disrespect the rule of law.”

On energy/climate change:

“We need an energy strategy for the future—an all-of-the-above strategy for the 21st century that develops every source of American-made energy.”

He added that his administration had “quadrupled the number of operating oilrigs to a record high” and “opened up millions of new acres for oil and gas exploration.”

Different times, different politician for sure. And of course the progressive left within the Democratic Party is much stronger now than it was then. But the principle remains valid. If you want to define yourself as being in the center of American politics you have to be willing to piss off those who are constantly trying to push you out of the center.

This is particularly important for the Harris campaign among difficult demographics like white working-class voters, where recent improvement—particularly in the Rustbelt—has been key to the campaign’s improved fortunes. These voters could stick or they may be just visiting; much will depend on whether the Harris campaign can convince them she is truly a different kind of Democrat than what she used to be.

It seems like a long time ago but it really wasn’t when Democrats generally understood the need to aggressively capture the center and, if the left stood in the way, the need to push them aside. Clinton and Obama understood this and they prospered accordingly. What seems to have happened is that intense criticisms within the party of various policy actions of these leaders—some justified, some not—have induced a collective amnesia about that era’s political wisdom. As a result, today’s Democratic leaders are now absolutely terrified of pissing off the left even where it would be greatly to the party’s benefit to do so.

It's time to recover that ancient wisdom. The stakes are high and the time is short. Democrats can’t afford to rely on Trump’s incompetence to cede them the center of American politics. They must seize it.